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Abstract
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players
of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope
with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable)
and impose it. However this answer is often inappropriate because
compelling an agent can be costly, unpopular or just hard to imple-
ment. Since both situations (no coordination and full coordination)
show opposite advantages and drawbacks, it is natural to study possi-
ble tradeoffs. In this paper we study a strategic game where the nodes
of a simple graph G are independent agents who try to form pairs:
e.g. jobs and applicants, tennis players for a match, etc. In many
instances of the game, a Nash equilibrium significantly deviates from
a social optimum. We analyze a scenario where we fix the strategy
of some players; the other players are free to make their choice. The
goal is to compel a minimum number of players and guarantee that
any possible equilibrium of the modified game is a social optimum, i.e.
created pairs must form a maximum matching of G. We mainly show
that this intriguing problem is NP-hard and propose an approximation
algorithm with a constant ratio.
1 Introduction
We propose to analyze the following non cooperative game. The input is a
simple graph G = (V,E) where every vertex is controlled by a player whose
strategy set is his neighborhood in G. If a vertex v selects a neighbor u while
u selects v then the two nodes are matched and they both have utility 1. If
a vertex v selects a neighbor u but u does not select v then v is unmatched
and its utility is 0.
1
Matchings in graphs are a model for many practical situations where
nodes may represent autonomous entities. For instance, suppose that each
node is a chess (or tennis) player searching for a partner. An edge between
two players means that they are available at the same time, or just that they
know each other. As another example, consider a set of companies on one
side, each offering a job, and on the other side a set of applicants. There is
an edge if the worker is qualified for the job.
Taking the number of matched nodes as the social welfare associated
with a strategy profile (a maximum cardinality matching is then a social
optimum), we can rapidly observe that the game has a high price of an-
archy. The system needs regulation because the uncoordinated and selfish
behavior of the players deteriorates its performance. How can we do this
regulation? One can compute a maximum matching (in polynomial time)
and force the players to follow it. However forcing some nodes’ strategy may
be costly, unpopular or simply hard to implement. When both cases (com-
plete freedom and total regulation) are not satisfactory, it is necessary to
make a tradeoff. In this paper we propose to fix the strategy of some nodes;
the other players are free to make their choice. The only requirement is that
every equilibrium of the modified game is a social optimum (a maximum
matching). Because it is unpopular/costly, the number of forced players
should be minimum. We call the optimization problem mfv for minimum
forced vertices. The challenging task is to identify the nodes which play a
central role in the graph.
1.1 Related work
There is a great interest in how uncoordinated and selfish agents make use
of a common resource [12, 9]. A popular way of modeling the problem is by
means of a noncooperative game and by viewing its equilibria as outcomes
of selfish behavior. In this context, the price of anarchy (PoA) [9], defined
as the value of the worst Nash equilibrium relative to the social optimum,
is a well established measure of the performance deterioration. A game
with a high PoA needs regulation and several ways to improve the system
performance exist in the literature, including coordination mechanisms [3, 6]
and Stackelberg strategies [11, 13, 2].
In [11] T. Roughgarden studies a nonatomic scheduling problem where
a rate of flow r should be to assigned to a set of parallel machines with load
dependent latencies. There are two kinds of players: a leader controlling a
fraction α of r and a set of followers, everyone handles an infinitesimal part of
(1−α)r. The leader, interested in optimizing the total latency, plays first (i.e.
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assigns αr to the machines) and keeps his strategy fixed. The followers react
independently and selfishly to the leaders strategy, optimizing their own
latency. The author gives an algorithm for computing a leader strategy that
induces an equilibrium with total latency no more than 1/α times that of the
optimal assignment of jobs to machines. He also mentions that his approach
falls into the area of Stackelberg games [11]. The mfv problem introduced
and studied in this article follows a rather similar approach. Instead of
optimizing the social welfare with a given rate of control on the players, one
tries to minimize the control on the players while an optimal social welfare
is guaranteed. In other words a leader interested in the social welfare fixes
the strategy of a minimum number of nodes so that any equilibrium reached
by the unforced nodes creates a maximum number of pairs.
The mfv problem is related to the well known stable marriage problem
(smp) [4]. In the smp there are n women and n men who rank the persons of
the opposite sex in a strict order of preference. A solution is a matching of
size n; it is unstable if two participants prefer being together than being with
their respective partner. Interestingly a stable matching always exists and
one can compute it with the algorithm of Gale and Shapley [4]. Many vari-
ants of the smp were studied in the literature: all participants are of the same
gender (the stable roommates problem) [7], ties in preferences are allowed [8],
players can give an incomplete list [8], etc. In fact the mfv problem has some
similarities with the stable roommates problem with simplified preferences:
every participant gives a list of equivalent/interchangeable partners, omit-
ting only those persons he would never accept under any circumstances.
1.2 Our results
We first give a formal definition of the noncooperative game and show that
it has a high price of anarchy. An associated optimization problem (mfv) is
then introduced. In Section 3 we show that we can decide in polynomial time
whether a solution is feasible or not. In particular one can detect graphs
for which any pure Nash equilibrium corresponds to a maximum matching
though no vertex is forced.
Next we investigate the complexity and the approximability of mfv. In-
terestingly the problem in graphs admitting a perfect matching is equivalent
to the vertex cover problem (see Subsection 4.1). In Subsection 4.2 we pro-
pose a 6-approximation algorithm called APPROX for general graphs. A part
of the proof showing that APPROX is a 6-approximation is given in Section 5.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
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2 The strategic game and the optimization prob-
lem
We are given a simple connected graph G = (V,E). Every vertex is con-
trolled by a player so we interchangeably mention a vertex and the player
who controls it. The strategy set of every player i is his neighborhood in
G, denoted by NG(i). Then the strategy set of a leaf in G is a singleton.
Throughout the article Si designates the action/strategy of player i. A
player is matched if the neighbor that he selects also selects him. Then i
is matched under S if SSi = i. A player has utility 1 when he is matched,
otherwise it is 0. The utility of player i under state S is denoted by ui(S).
The social welfare is defined as the number of matched nodes. We focus
on the pure strategy Nash equilibria, considering them as the possible out-
comes of the game. It is not difficult to see that every instance admits a pure
Nash equilibrium. In addition, the players converge to a Nash equilibrium
after at most |V |/2 rounds.
Interestingly there are some graphs for which the players always reach a
social optimum: paths of length 1, 2 and 4; cycles of length 3 and 5; stars,
etc. However the social welfare can be very far from the social optimum in
many instances as the following result states.
Theorem 1. The PoA is max{2/|V |, 1/∆} where ∆ denotes the maximum
degree of a node.
Proof. The social welfare is denoted by SW(S) under state S. Let S and
S∗ be a Nash equilibrium and an optimum state respectively. First remark
that at least two players are matched in S, i.e. SW(S) ≥ 2. Indeed, take
any player i. If SSi = i then i and Si are matched. If SSi 6= i then Si must
be matched with a node j 6= i because S is a Nash equilibrium. Using the
fact that SW(S∗) ≤ |V |, it follows that PoA ≤ 2/|V |. A complete graph
gives a tight example.
Now let us show that PoA ≤ 1/∆. Since uSi(S) must be equal to
1 for every i ∈ V , otherwise S is not a Nash equilibrium, we get that
maxj∈NG(i) uj(S) ≥ 1 for every i ∈ V . We deduce that
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈NG(i)
uj(S) ≥
∑
i∈V
max
j∈NG(i)
uj(S) ≥ |V | ≥ SW(S
∗).
We also remark that
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈NG(i)
uj(S) ≤ ∆
∑
i∈V
ui(S) = ∆SW(S).
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Combining the previous two inequalities, we get that SW(S)/SW(S∗) ≥
1/∆. A tight example for any given ∆ can be the following:
• the vertex set is made of 2∆ nodes denoted by {x, y}∪{v1, · · · , v∆−1}∪
{v′1, · · · , v
′
∆−1}
• for every i ∈ [1..∆ − 1] build the edges (vi, v
′
i), (x, vi) and (y, v
′
i).
• add the edge (x, y).
Clearly both x and y have degree ∆. The state S where Svi = x, Sv′i = y,
Sx = y and Sy = x is a Nash equilibrium of social welfare 2 (only x and y
are matched). The state S∗ where vi is matched with v
′
i for every i, and x
is matched with y, is a an optimum state of value 2∆. 
Theorem 1 indicates that the system needs regulation to achieve an ac-
ceptable state where a maximum number of players are matched. That is
why we introduce a related optimization problem, called mfv for minimum
forced vertices.
For a graph G = (V,E), instance of the mfv problem, a solution is a
pair 〈T,Q〉 where Q is a subset of players and every player in Q is forced
to select node Ti ∈ NG(i) (i.e. T = (Ti)i∈Q). In the following 〈T,Q〉 is
called a Stackelberg strategy or simply a solution. A state S is a Stackelberg
equilibrium resulting from the Stackelberg strategy 〈T,Q〉 if Si = Ti for
every i ∈ Q, and ∀i ∈ V \Q, ∀j ∈ NG(i), ui(S) ≥ ui(S−i, j). Here (S−i, j)
denotes S where Si is set to j.
A solution 〈T,Q〉 to the mfv problem is said feasible if every Stackelberg
equilibrium is a social optimum. The value of 〈T,Q〉 is |Q| to be minimized.
Now let us introduce some notions that we use throughout the article.
The matching induced by a strategy profile S is denoted byMS and defined
as {(u, v) ∈ E : Su = v and Sv = u}. We also define three useful notions of
compatibility:
• A matching M and a state S are compatible if M =MS
• A state S and a solution 〈T,Q〉 are compatible if Ti = Si for all i ∈ Q
• A matching M and a solution 〈T,Q〉 are compatible if there exists a
state S compatible with both M and 〈T,Q〉.
We sometimes write that a matching is induced by a solution if they are
compatible.
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3 Feasible solutions of the mfv problem
Though it is easy to produce a feasible solution to any instance of the mfv
problem, deciding whether a given solution, even the empty one, is feasible
is not straightforward.
A maximum matching compatible with a solution < T,Q > can be
computed in polynomial time: start from G, remove every edge (u, v) such
that u is forced to play a node w different from v, and compute a maximum
matching in the resulting graph. If the result is not a maximum matching
in G then it is clear that 〈T,Q〉 is not feasible. However it is not necessarily
feasible when the resulting matching is maximum in G. In the sequel, M∗
denotes a matching compatible with < T,Q > and we assume that M∗ is
maximum in G. In addition S∗ denotes a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible
with < T,Q > and M∗.
We resort to patterns called diminishing configurations.
Definition 1.
• M∗ and 〈T,Q〉 possess a long diminishing configuration if there are
2r vertices v1, . . . , v2r arranged in a path as on Figure 1 (a) (r is an
integer such that r ≥ 2) and a strategy profile S∗ satisfying
– S∗ is a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with < T,Q > and
M∗
– if v1 /∈ Q then there is no v ∈ V \ {v1, . . . , v2r} such that S
∗
v = v1
– if v2r /∈ Q then there is no v ∈ V \{v1, . . . , v2r} such that S
∗
v = v2r
• M∗ and 〈T,Q〉 possess a short diminishing configuration if there exists
one pattern among those depicted on Figure 1 (b) to (f) and a strategy
profile S∗ satisfying
– S∗ is a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with < T,Q > and
M∗
– there is no node v ∈ V \ {v1, v2} such that S
∗
v ∈ {v1, v2}
• M∗ and 〈T,Q〉 possess an average diminishing configuration if there
exists one pattern among those depicted on Figure 1 (g) and (h) and
a strategy profile S∗ satisfying
– S∗ is a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with < T,Q > and
M∗
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Figure 1: The eight diminishing configurations. Every bold edge belongs to
M∗, every thin edge belongs to E \ M∗. A white node is not in Q while
crossed node must belong to Q. Grey nodes can be in Q or not. For the
case (e), nodes x and y (resp. z) can be the same.
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Figure 2: For each configuration of Figure 1 there is a way to decrease the
matching by one unit. The corresponding strategy profile remains a Nash
equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉.
– there is no v ∈ V \ {v1, v2, y} such that S
∗
v ∈ {v1, v2, z}
In the following Lemma, we assume that M∗, the maximum matching
compatible with 〈T,Q〉, is also maximum in G.
Lemma 1. 〈T,Q〉 is not feasible if and only if M∗ and 〈T,Q〉 possess a
diminishing configuration.
Proof.
(⇐) Suppose that M∗ and 〈T,Q〉 possess a diminishing configuration.
One can slightly modify S∗, as done on Figure 2 for each case, such that the
strategy profile remains a Stackelberg equilibrium and the corresponding
matching has decreased by one unit. Therefore 〈T,Q〉 is not feasible.
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Figure 3: The four cases for the connected components of M′∆M∗. Edges
of M∗ and M′ are respectively solid and dashed.
(⇒) Let S′ be a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉 such that
its associated matching M′ is not maximum in G. Consider the symmetric
difference M′∆M∗. Its connected components are of four kinds:
• a path which starts with an edge of M′, alternates edges of M∗ and
M′, and ends with an edge of M′ (see case 1 in Figure 3)
• a path which starts with an edge of M′, alternates edges of M∗ and
M′, and ends with an edge of M∗ (see case 2 in Figure 3)
• a path which starts with an edge of M∗, alternates edges of M∗ and
M′, and ends with an edge of M∗ (see case 3 in Figure 3)
• an even cycle which alternates edges of M∗ and M′ (see case 4 in
Figure 3)
Since |M∗| > |M′| there must be one component of the third kind
because this is the only case which contains more edges of M∗ than edges
of M′. Notice that the two nodes on the extremities of this component are
unmatched inM′. We consider two cases, whether this component contains
at least two edges of M∗ (Case A), or just one (Case B).
Case A: Let us denote by v1, . . . , v2r the nodes of the component. Since S
′
v 6=
S∗v holds for every v ∈ {v2, · · · , v2r−1}, we deduce that {v2, · · · , v2r−1}∩Q =
∅. If v1 and v2r belong toQ then {v1, · · · , v2r} and S
∗ form a long diminishing
configuration. Suppose that neither v1 nor v2r belong to Q. If there is no
vertex v ∈ V \ {v1, . . . , v2r} such that S
∗
v ∈ {v1, v2r} then {v1, · · · , v2r}
and S∗ form a long diminishing configuration. If there is a node v ∈ Q
such that Tv ∈ {v1, v2r} then S
′ is not a Stackelberg equilibrium (v1 and
v2r are unforced and unmatched in M
′ so one of them can play v and be
matched), contradiction. If there is a node v /∈ Q∪{v2, · · · , v2r−1} such that
S∗v ∈ {v1, v2r} then v is unmatched in M
∗, all its neighbors are matched
because M∗ is maximum, and S′v /∈ {v1, v2r} because S
′ is a Stackelberg
equilibrium. One can set S∗v ← S
′
v every time this case happens and deduce
9
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Figure 4: Bold edges belong to M∗ and thin edges exist in the graph.
that {v1, · · · , v2r} and S
∗ form a long diminishing configuration. Indeed S∗
though modified remains a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible withM∗ and
〈T,Q〉.
The last case is when v1 /∈ Q while v2r ∈ Q (the case v2r /∈ Q while v1 ∈ Q
is completely symetric). If there is no node v ∈ V \ {v1, · · · , v2r} such that
S∗v = v1 then {v1, · · · , v2r} and S
∗ form a long diminishing configuration.
If there is a node v ∈ Q such that Tv = v1 then S
′ is not a Stackelberg
equilibrium, contradiction. If there is a node v /∈ Q such that S∗v = v1 then
S′v 6= v1 because S
′ is a Stackelberg equilibrium. One can set S∗v ← S
′
v every
time this case happens and deduce that {v1, · · · , v2r} and S
∗ form a long
diminishing configuration.
Case B: Let v1 and v2 be the two nodes of the component. These nodes are
matched together inM∗ but unmatched inM′ so {v1, v2}∩Q = ∅, S
′
v1
6= v2
and S′v2 6= v1 (because S
′ is a Stackelberg equilibrium). Let us suppose that
S′v1 = v3 and S
′
v2
= v4. It is possible that v3 = v4. Since S
′ is a Stackelberg
equilibrium, S′v3 /∈ {v1, v2} and S
′
v4
/∈ {v1, v2}. We assume that S
′
v3
= v5 and
S′v4 = v6. Of course v5 = v6 when v3 = v4. It is possible that v3 = v6 and
v4 = v5 when v3 6= v4. If v3 and v4 are both unmatched inM
∗ (and v3 6= v4)
then (v3, v1, v2, v4) is an augmenting path, contradicting the optimality of
M∗. Then we can list 5 different cases, denoted by B1 to B5, and depicted
on Figure 4. For case B4 (resp. B5), v5 (resp. v6) must be matched with a
node that we denote by v7, since otherwise M
∗ is not optimal.
Before we analyze the 5 cases, we focus on the neighbors of v1 or v2
which are unmatched in M∗:
• Suppose there is a node v such that v /∈ Q, S∗v = v1, v 6= v2 (resp.
S∗v = v2, v 6= v1) and v has a neighbor w /∈ {v1, v2}. Node v is
unmatched in M∗ but w is matched because M∗ is maximum. Then
modify S∗ and set S∗v = w. This modification is done each time it is
possible. Remark that S∗ remains a Stackelberg equilibrium after the
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modification.
• Suppose there is a node v such that v /∈ Q and v has no neighbor
w /∈ {v1, v2}. ThenNG(v) ⊆ {v1, v2} and it contradicts the fact that S
′
is a Stackelberg equilibrium because v1 or v2 could change its strategy
(play v) and benefit.
• Suppose there is a node v such that v ∈ Q and Tv ∈ {v1, v2}, i.e. v is
forced to play v1 or v2. It contradicts the fact that S
′ is a Stackelberg
equilibrium because v1 or v2 could change its strategy, play v, and
benefit.
It follows that we can assume that there is no node v such that S∗v ∈
{v1, v2}.
Cases B1, B2 and B3: These cases correspond to the short diminishing
configurations of Figure 1 (b), (c) and (d) respectively.
Case B4: Suppose that v3 ∈ Q. If Tv3 ∈ {v1, v2} then it contradicts the
fact that S′ is a Stackelberg equilibrium since v1 or v2 could modify their
strategy (play v3) and benefit. Then Tv3 /∈ {v1, v2} a short diminishing
configuration as the one of Figure 1 (f) is found.
Suppose that v3 /∈ Q. If v5 ∈ Q then Tv5 = v7 and S
′ is not a Stackelberg
equilibrium because v3 could play v1 instead of v5 and benefit, contradiction.
We deduce that v5 /∈ Q. Suppose there is a node v /∈ {v3, v5} such that
S∗v = v7. That node would be unmatched in M
∗ but (v, v7, v5, v3) would be
an augmenting path, contradicting the optimality of M∗. If S∗v3 = v7 then
set S∗v3 = v5. An average diminishing configuration as the one of Figure 1
(g) is then found.
Case B5: Suppose that v4 ∈ Q. If Tv4 ∈ {v1, v2} then it contradicts the
fact that S′ is a Stackelberg equilibrium since v1 or v2 could modify their
strategy (play v4) and benefit. Then Tv4 /∈ {v1, v2} and a short diminishing
configuration as the one of Figure 1 (e) is found.
Suppose that v4 /∈ Q. If v6 ∈ Q then Tv6 = v7. We deduce that v4
is unmatched in M′. Since S′v2 = v4 and S
′
v4
= v6, it contradicts the fact
that S′ is a Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore v6 /∈ Q. Suppose there is a
node v 6= v4 such that S
∗
v = v7. That node would be unmatched in M
∗ but
(v, v7, v6, v4) would be an augmenting path, contradicting the optimality of
M∗. If S∗v4 = v7 then set S
∗
v4
= v6. An average diminishing configuration
as the one of Figure 1 (h) is then found. 
Notice that Lemma 1 is obtained with any maximum matching M∗
compatible with 〈T,Q〉.
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Theorem 2. One can decide in polynomial time whether a solution 〈T,Q〉
is feasible.
Proof. Compute a maximum matching M∗ compatible with 〈T,Q〉. If M∗
is not optimum in G then 〈T,Q〉 is not feasible. From now on suppose that
M∗ is optimum. Let S∗ be any Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with
both M∗ and 〈T,Q〉. Using Lemma 1, 〈T,Q〉 is not feasible iff M∗ and
〈T,Q〉 possess a diminishing configuration. Short and average diminishing
configurations contain a constant number of nodes so we can easily check
their existence in polynomial time.
For every pair of distinct nodes {a, b} such that a and b are matched
in M∗ but not together, we check whether a long diminishing configuration
with extremities a and b exists. Suppose that a (resp. b) is matched with a′
(resp. b′). If there is a node v ∈ V \ {a′, b′} such that S∗v ∈ {a, b} in every
Stackelberg equilibrium S∗ compatible with 〈T,Q〉 then the answer is no.
Otherwise every unmatched neighbor v of a or b can play a strategy S∗v /∈
{a, b} and S∗ remains a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉.
If {a′, b′} ∩ Q 6= ∅ then the answer is also no. Now consider the graph
G′ = G[V \(Q∪{a, b})] to which we add (a, a′) and (b, b′). Deciding whether
there exists an a− b path in G′ which alternates edges ofM∗ and edges not
in M∗, and such that the first and last edge of this path are respectively
(a, a′) and (b, b′), can be done in O(n2.5) steps. This result is due to J.
Edmonds and a sketch of proof can be found in [10] (Lemma 1.1). This
problem is equivalent to checking whether a long diminishing configuration
with extremities a and b exists in G. 
We have mentioned in the previous section that for some graphs, forcing
no node is the optimal Stackelberg strategy, leading to an optimal solution
with value 0. Such a particular case can be detected in polynomial time
by Theorem 2. In the following study of the approximability of the mfv
problem, we will focus on instances for which the strategy of at least one
node must be fixed. We will also make the assumption that any vertex has
at most one leaf in his neighborhood. As we will see, this restriction can be
assumed wlog.
4 Complexity and approximation
4.1 The perfect matching case
Let G be the class of graphs admitting a perfect matching.
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Theorem 3. For any ρ ≥ 1, mfv restricted to graphs in G is ρ-approximable
in polynomial time if and only if the minimum vertex cover problem (in
general graphs) is ρ-approximable in polynomial time.
Proof. The proof will be done in two steps. In the first step, we will give
a polynomial time reduction preserving approximation from the minimum
vertex cover problem to mfv restricted to graphs in G, while in the second
step we will produce a polynomial time reduction preserving approximation
from mfv restricted to graphs in G to the minimum vertex cover problem.
• First step. Let G be a simple graph, instance of the minimum ver-
tex cover problem. We suppose that V (G) = {v1, · · · , vn} and E(G) =
{e1, · · · , em}. Let us build a simple graph G
′, instance of mfv, as fol-
lows: take G, add a copy of every vertex and link every vertex to its copy.
More formally we set V (G′) = {v1, · · · , vn} ∪ {v
′
1, · · · , v
′
n} and E(G
′) =
{e1, · · · , em} ∪ {(vi, v
′
i) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. Remark that G
′ admits a unique
perfect matching made of all edges (vi, v
′
i). Then G ∈ G. We claim that G
admits a vertex cover C of size at most k iff G′ admits a feasible solution of
the same size.
(⇒) Consider the solution 〈T,Q〉 where Q = C and for every vi ∈ C,
set Tvi = v
′
i. Since C is a vertex cover, there is no pair of nodes
vi, vj ∈ V (G) \ C such that (vi, vj) ∈ E(G). Hence vi (resp. vj) can
only match with v′i (resp. v
′
j).
(⇐) Suppose that there are two nodes vi, vj ∈ V (G)\Q such that (vi, vj) ∈
E(G). These nodes can match because they are not forced, contra-
dicting that 〈T,Q〉 is a feasible solution (vi and vj must match with
v′i and v
′
j respectively). Therefore Q ∩ V (G) is a vertex cover of G, of
size at most |Q|.
• Second step. Let G = (V,E) be a graph admitting a perfect matching, i.e.,
G ∈ G. Let G′ be a graph defined as V (G′) = {v ∈ V (G) : dG(v) > 1} and
E(G′) = {(x, y) ∈ E(G) : x, y ∈ V (G′)}. We claim that there is a vertex
cover of size at most k in G′ iff mfv has a solution of value at most k in G.
(⇒) Let C be a vertex cover of size k in G′. Compute a maximum matching
M of G. Build a solution 〈T,Q〉 to the mfv problem as follows: force
every node of C to follow the matching M. The matching being
perfect, it is always possible. It is clear that k nodes are forced.
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Let us prove that every Stackelberg equilibrium S compatible with
〈T,Q〉 induces the optimal matching M. Take an edge (u, v) ∈ M.
If both u and v are forced then Tu = v and Tv = u, by construction.
Suppose that only u is forced. We have Tu = v and there is no node
w 6= u such that Tw = v, by construction. If there is an unforced node
w ∈ NG(v) then either w ∈ V (G
′), it contradicts the fact that C is a
valid vertex cover of G′, or v ∈ V (G)\V (G′), contradicts the fact that
M is a perfect matching of G. Now suppose that neither u nor v is
forced. At least one of them, say u, has degree 1 since otherwise C is
not a valid vertex cover. As previously an unforced node w ∈ NG(v)
would contradict that C is a valid vertex cover. Then u can only play
v and v’s rational behavior is to play u.
(⇐) Take a solution 〈T,Q〉 with |Q| = k and build a vertex cover C :=
V (G′) ∩ Q. It is clear that C has size at most k. We can observe
that C is not a vertex cover in G′ iff there exists an edge (u, v) with
dG(u) > 1, dG(v) > 1 and {u, v} ∩Q = ∅. Let M be an optimal (and
perfect) matching induced by a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible
with 〈T,Q〉. If u and v are matched in M then u (resp. v) has a
matched neighbor u′ 6= v (resp. v′ 6= u). If u (resp. v) plays u′ (resp.
v′) then we get an equilibrium which contradicts the fact that 〈T,Q〉
is a feasible solution. If u and v are not matched in M then suppose
that u is matched with u′ while v is matched with v′ (the matching is
perfect). If we remove (u, u′), (v, v′) and add (u, v) then the state is
an equilibrium (neither u′ nor v′ can deviate and be matched with a
node sinceM is perfect) but the resulting matching is not optimal. 
The following corollary is based on known results for vertex cover
[1, 5].
Corollary 1. The mfv problem is APX-hard and 2-approximable in G.
4.2 General graphs
We are going to describe and analyse an approximation algorithm called
APPROX. It computes a particular maximum matching M and forces some
nodes to follow it. The analysis is done in two phases: (i) APPROX gives a
2-approximation of solutions inducing M (Theorem 4), (ii) the worst case
ratio between an optimal solution inducingM and a global optimum for the
mfv problem is 3 (Theorem 5). Combining Theorems 4 and 5 leads to a
6-approximation.
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Figure 5: Bold edges are in M . w has degree 2.
APPROX is as follows. If G is a triangle or a cycle of length 5, then we
do not need to force any vertex. Otherwise, let us consider a maximum
matching M such that every leaf in G is matched. We modify the matching
M as follows (see Figure 5 for an illustration of the 2 steps):
1. While there exists an unmatched vertex w of degree 2 such that its
neighbors u1 and u2 are matched with v1 and v2, and v1 and v2 are
adjacent: in this cycle of length 5 (w, u1, v1, v2, u2), instead of (u1, v1)
and (u2, v2), take two edges such that the unmatched vertex has degree
at least 3. This is always possible since G is not a cycle of length 5.
2. While there exists an unmatched vertex w of degree 2 such that its
neighbors u1 and u2 are matched together, remove (u1, u2) from M ,
and add (u1, w) if u1 has degree 2 or add (u2, v) otherwise. Note that
the new unmatched vertex has degree at least 3 now, since G is not a
triangle.
Note that these two steps finish in at most n iterations. At the end M
does not have any of the two “forbidden” configurations (obviously step 2
does not create a forbidden configuration of the first type).
Based on the modified maximum matching M , we consider the following
steps (see Figure 6 for an illustration):
1. While there exist in G two unforced adjacent vertices u, v such that u
and v are matched in M but not together: force u and v according to
M .
2. While there exists in G an edge (u, v) ∈ M such that both u and v
are unforced and adjacent to some other matched vertices u1 and v1
(possibly u1 = v1): force u and v according to M .
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3. While there exists an unmatched vertex w which is adjacent to u1 and
u2, where u1 is matched with v1 6= u2, u2 is matched with v2, v1 has
degree at least 2 and u1, v1 and u2 are not forced: force u1 and u2
according to M .
Theorem 4. Let < T ∗, Q∗ > be an optimum solution among the feasible
solutions that are compatible with M . Then Algorithm APPROX outputs a
feasible solution < T,Q > such that |Q| ≤ 2|Q∗|.
Proof. We first have to show that the output solution is feasible. To see
this, first note that two adjacent vertices u and v that are matched in M
but not together cannot be matched together in an equilibrium compatible
with < T,Q >. Indeed, if u and v were not forced, the edge (u, v) would
have been considered in Step 1 of APPROX. So we only have to show that for
each edge (u, v) ∈M , at least one vertex between u and v is matched in any
equilibrium compatible with < T,Q >. If one vertex, say u, is forced, then
v has to be matched in any equilibrium compatible with < T,Q >. So let
us consider the case where neither u nor v is forced. Thanks to Step 2 we
know that one vertex, say u, is not adjacent to another matched vertex.
• If u (or v) is a leaf, then clearly v (or u) is matched in any equilibrium.
• Otherwise, we can assume now that u is adjacent to one or several
unmatched vertices w1, w2, · · · such that all their neighbors but u (and
possibly v) are forced. Indeed, if such a wi were adjacent to an unforced
vertex u2 6= u, v, wi would have been considered in Step 3. Then, in
an equilibrium compatible with < T,Q >, either u plays v and v is
necessarily matched, or u plays some wi and in this case wi is matched
either with u or with v.
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Now, we prove that |Q| ≤ 2|Q∗|. To prove this, we consider a solution
< T ∗, Q∗ > where no unmatched vertex in M is forced (see Corollary 4 on
page 21). We achieve this by showing that at each step of the algorithm,
when we force two vertices we can show that any optimum solution has to
force at least one.
Let us first consider Step 1 of the algorithm. Q∗ must contain at least one
vertex between u and v, otherwise there exists an equilibrium compatible
with < T ∗, Q∗ > where u and v are matched, the mate u′ of u in M plays
u, and the mate v′ of v in M plays v. This is due to the fact that there is
no unmatched vertex w of degree 2 such that the neighbors of w are u′ and
v′ (Step 1 of the modification of M), so each unmatched vertex can play a
vertex different from u′ and v′.
Now, consider Step 2. Q∗ must contain at least one vertex between u and
v, otherwise there exists an equilibrium compatible with < T ∗, Q∗ > where
u plays a matched vertex, v plays a matched vertex. This is due to the fact
that there is no unmatched vertex w of degree 2 such that the neighbors of
w are u and v (Step 2 of the modification of M), so each unmatched vertex
can play a vertex different from u and v.
Now, consider Step 3. Note that v1 and v2 cannot be adjacent to an
unmatched vertex different from w (an augmenting path would exist), and
that at this step of the algorithm if v1 is adjacent to v2 then v2 is forced
(otherwise (v1, v2) would have been considered in Step 1). Then Q
∗ must
contain at least one vertex between v1, u1 and u2, otherwise there exists an
equilibrium compatible with < T ∗, Q∗ > where w and u2 are matched, u1
plays w, v1 plays another (i.e. different from u1) (matched) vertex and v2
plays u2. This is an equilibrium since as we said if v1 plays v2 then v2 is
forced, and since each unmatched vertex can play a vertex different from
u1 (recall that all the leaves are matched). To get the final ratio 2, just
remark that v1 (and u1 and u2) will not be considered in another step of the
algorithm (since v1 is not adjacent to an unmatched vertex), so we do not
count twice the same vertex forced in < T ∗, Q∗ >. 
The next step is the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. Let M∗ be a maximum matching saturating all the leaves
of G. Then, there exists a feasible solution 〈T ′, Q′〉 of G = (V,E) and a
Stackelberg equilibrium S′ compatible with 〈T ′, Q′〉 such that MS
′
=M∗ and
|Q′| ≤ 3|Q∗| where 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 is an optimal solution of G.
For the sake of readability, the proof of Theorem 5, which requires several
intermediate result, is given later (next section). Combine Theorems 4 and
5 to get the main result of this section.
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Corollary 2. APPROX is a 6-approximation algorithm for the mfv problem
in general graphs.
5 A proof of Theorem 5
We first see some conditions to build feasible or optimum solutions. We will
show in particular some interesting properties that are verified by at least
one optimum solution. These properties will then be used in order to show
Theorem 5, a stepping stone of our approximation result.
Let us first introduce the concepts of basis of a solution and of good
solution.
Definition 2. The basis of a feasible solution 〈T,Q〉 of G = (V,E) is the
edge set Mb(〈T,Q〉) = {(u, Tu) : u ∈ Q}. A feasible solution 〈T,Q〉 of a
graph G = (V,E) is called good if its basis is a matching of G.
In order to keep simple notations, we will write Mb when no confusion
is possible. The notion of basis of a feasible solution 〈T,Q〉 is important.
We will show that any optimum solution is good, and that every maximum
matching containing its basis Mb is induced by a Stackelberg equilibrium S
compatible with 〈T,Q〉.
Before showing this, let us begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let 〈T,Q〉 be a solution of G = (V,E). Let M be a matching
such that Ti = j each time (i, j) ∈M and i ∈ Q. There exists a Stackelberg
equilibrium S compatible with 〈T,Q〉 such that M ⊆ MS. In particular, if
M is maximum, then M =MS.
Proof. Consider a matching M ′ containing M , compatible with 〈T,Q〉,
and maximal w.r.t. these properties. This means that if u is not matched,
then either it is forced, or all its neighbors are either matched or forced not
toward u. Let S be a state such that if (u, v) in M ′ then u plays v and v
plays u, otherwise if u is unmatched in M ′ then it plays one of its neighbors
(Tu if u is forced). S is a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible withM
′, hence
with M ′ =MS while M ⊆M ′. 
As a consequence of Lemma 2, the basis Mb of a good solution is con-
tained in some maximum matching of the graph. Moreover, for any maxi-
mum matching M∗ which contains Mb, there is a Stackelberg equilibrium S
compatible with 〈T,Q〉 such that MS =M∗.
Now, we prove that every optimum solution is good, via the following
theorem.
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Theorem 6. For any feasible solution 〈T,Q〉 of G = (V,E), if it is not
good then we can find in polynomial time a good feasible solution 〈T 0, Q0〉 of
G = (V,E) such that Q0 ⊂ Q and T 0 is the restriction of T to the vertices
in Q0.
Proof. Let 〈T,Q〉 be a feasible solution of G = (V,E) which is not good,
i.e. the basis Mb = {(u, Tu) : u ∈ Q} of 〈T,Q〉 is not a matching of G =
(V,E). So, there are u, v ∈ Q such that either Tu = v and Tv = w 6= u,
or Tu = Tw = v where v 6= u,w (see Figure 7). In Case 2, v is not forced
(otherwise it is Case 1).
In both cases, we will show that 〈T \ {Tu}, Q \ {u}〉 is feasible. For this,
let M∗ be a maximum matching compatible with 〈T,Q〉 containing (v,w) -
this is possible in Case 1 since w cannot be forced to a vertex different from
v (otherwise M∗ is not maximum), and in Case 2 since v is not forced. Of
course, M∗ is compatible with 〈T \ {Tu}, Q \ {u}〉. If 〈T \ {Tu}, Q \ {u}〉
is not feasible then, using Lemma 1, we know that 〈T \ {Tu}, Q \ {u}〉 and
M∗ possess a diminishing configuration based on a Stackelberg equilibrium
S. In S, we can assume that u plays v since u is unmatched in M∗ and v is
matched. Then S is also an equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉. Since 〈T,Q〉
is feasible, the diminishing configuration must contain u as an unforced
vertex. Since u is unmatched, the only configurations are (g) and (h) with
x = u. In both cases, v or w being forced, v 6= v1, v2 and w 6= v1, v2. If there
is a (g) configuration w.r.t. 〈T \ {Tu}, Q \ {u}〉 and M
∗, then there is an
(f) configuration w.r.t. 〈T,Q〉 andM∗, composed of vertices v1, v2, u and v.
Alternatively, if there is an (h) configuration w.r.t. 〈T \ {Tu}, Q \ {u}〉 and
M∗, then there is an (e) configuration w.r.t. 〈T,Q〉 and M∗. Contradiction.
Hence, by applying the previous process, we obtain in linear time a
feasible solution 〈T 0, Q0〉 of G = (V,E) such that T 0 ⊂ T and Q0 ⊂ Q. By
construction, the basis of 〈T 0, Q0〉, Mb = {(u, T
0
u ) : u ∈ Q
0} is a matching.

Using Theorem 6, we easily deduce the following result:
Corollary 3. Any minimal (for inclusion) feasible solution is good. In
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particular, any optimal feasible solution is good.
Now, we show that, informally, we can suppose that in some optimum
solution the forced vertices are matched in a given matching.
Lemma 3. Let 〈T,Q〉 be a good feasible solution of G = (V,E). If there
exists a Stackelberg equilibrium S compatible with 〈T,Q〉 and a node x0 ∈ Q
unmatched in MS, then 〈T 0, Q0〉 is a good feasible solution of G = (V,E)
where Q0 = Q ∪ {x2} \ {x0}, x2 = STx0 and T
0
x2
= Tx0 (see Figure 8 for an
illustration). Moreover, S is compatible with 〈T 0, Q0〉.
Proof. Let 〈T,Q〉 be a good feasible solution of G = (V,E) and S be
an equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉 verifying the hypothesis. Let x1 =
Tx0 . M
S is a maximum matching where x0 is unmatched. M
S is also
compatible with 〈T 0, Q0〉 (since (x1, x2) ∈ M
S) (see Figure 8). Suppose
that 〈T 0, Q0〉 is not a feasible solution. By Lemma 1, 〈T 0, Q0〉 and MS
possess a diminishing configuration on the base of a Stackelberg equilibrium
S′. Note that since x1 is matched and x0 is not matched in M
S , we can
assume that S′x0 = x1. Then, it is easy to see that S
′ is also a Stackelberg
equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉. Since 〈T,Q〉 is feasible, it means that
the diminishing configuration w.r.t. 〈T 0, Q0〉 and MS contains x2 as a
necessarily forced vertex and/or x0 as a necessarily unforced vertex. But
x2 is matched and there is no matched and necessarily forced vertex in
the diminishing configurations. Then, it is either configuration (g) or (h),
where x = x0. Since S
′
x0
= x1 and x1 is matched with x2 which is forced
in 〈T 0, Q0〉, x1 6= v1, v2. Then, a (g) configuration w.r.t. 〈T
0, Q0〉 and
MS corresponds to an (f) configuration w.r.t. 〈T,Q〉 and MS , and an (h)
configuration w.r.t. 〈T 0, Q0〉 and MS corresponds to an (e) configuration
w.r.t. 〈T,Q〉 and MS . Contradiction.
It is easy to check that 〈T 0, Q0〉 is a good solution (no vertex x3 is
forced toward x2 in 〈T,Q〉 otherwise an augmenting path (x3, x2, x1, x0)
exists, meaning that MS is not maximum). 
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From Lemma 3, we deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let 〈T,Q〉 be a feasible (resp. optimum) solution and S be a
Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with 〈T,Q〉. There exists a feasible (resp.
optimum) solution 〈T 0, Q0〉 compatible with S such that every forced vertex
(in Q0) is matched inMS. In particular, MS contains the basis of 〈T 0, Q0〉.
Given a graph G = (V,E), we denote by L the set of leaves of G and
for ℓ ∈ L, wℓ is the neighbor of ℓ. Finally, ML = {(ℓ, wℓ) : ℓ ∈ L}. Note
that if several leaves are adjacent to the same vertex, then the problem is
obviously equivalent when we remove in the graph all these leaves but one.
In the sequel we will assume that two leaves are never adjacent to the same
vertex. In other words, ML is a matching.
In the following lemma, we mainly prove that there is an optimal solution
〈T,Q〉 and a compatible Stackelberg equilibrium whose induced matching
contains ML.
Lemma 4. From any good feasible solution 〈T,Q〉 of G = (V,E), one can
find in polynomial time a good feasible solution 〈T 0, Q0〉 such that |Q0| ≤
|Q| and there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium S0 compatible with 〈T
0, Q0〉
satisfying ML ⊆M
S0 .
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that 〈T,Q〉 is such that
for every equilibrium S compatible with 〈T,Q〉, ML * MS . Hence, we
must have wℓ ∈ Q and x = Twℓ 6= ℓ for some ℓ ∈ L (note that ℓ /∈ Q by
Theorem 6). We will prove that two alternatives are possible: either case (1)
x ∈ Q∩NG(wℓ) and Tx = wℓ, or case (2) A ⊆ Q and ∀v ∈ A, Tv 6= Twℓ where
A = NG(x) \ {wℓ}. Remark that since 〈T,Q〉 is a good feasible solution, if
x ∈ Q ∩ NG(wℓ), then Tx = wℓ (and such x is unique) and if A ⊆ Q, then
∀v ∈ A, Tv 6= Twℓ (see Figure 9 for an illustration of the two cases).
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Assume that cases (1) and (2) do not hold. Consider the partial state S′
with S′x = y and S
′
y = x where y ∈ NG(x) \Q. Obviously, x /∈ L (ML is a
matching) and such a y exists since (1) and (2) do not hold. We can extend
S′ into a forced Nash equilibrium S0 compatible with 〈T,Q〉. We get that
MS
0
∪ {(ℓ, wℓ)} is a matching, contradiction.
• Assume that Case (1) happens. Consider 〈T 0, Q0〉 which is the same
as 〈T,Q〉 up to the facts that x is unforced and T 0wℓ = ℓ. We can check
that it is a good feasible solution.
• Assume that Case (2) holds. In this case, consider 〈T 0, Q0〉 which is
the same as 〈T,Q〉 up to the fact that T 0wℓ = ℓ. As previously, we can
check that 〈T 0, Q0〉 is a good feasible solution.
By repeating this procedure for every ℓ ∈ L such that wℓ ∈ Q and
Twℓ 6= ℓ, we obtain the expected result. 
Based on the previous intermediate results, we are now able to give a
proof of Theorem 5 (we reproduce its statement for the sake of readability).
Theorem 5. Let M∗ be a maximum matching saturating all the leaves
of G. Then, there exists a feasible solution 〈T ′, Q′〉 of G = (V,E) and a
Stackelberg equilibrium S′ compatible with 〈T ′, Q′〉 such that MS
′
=M∗ and
|Q′| ≤ 3|Q∗| where 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 is an optimal solution of G.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be a graph such that ML is a matching. Let M
∗ be
a maximum matching saturating all the leaves of G = (V,E). Consider an
optimal solution 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 of G such that there is a Stackelberg equilibrium
S where |MS ∩ M∗| is as large as possible. Moreover, by Corollary 4,
we assume that the basis of 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 is included in MS ; in particular, all
vertices of Q∗ are matched in MS . Also, assume that S satisfies Lemma
4, i.e., ML ⊆ M
S ∩M∗. It it was not the case, |MS ∩M∗| would not be
maximum (the transformation in the proof of the Lemma would increase
|MS ∩M∗|).
Suppose that MS 6= M∗ (otherwise, we are done). Thus, there ex-
ists some alternating path or alternating cycle of MS∆M∗ where ∆ is the
symmetric difference operator. The solution 〈T ′, Q′〉 will be built by first
examining the partial graph induced byMS∆M∗ and then the partial graph
induced by MS ∩M∗.
Let G′ = (V,MS∆M∗) and consider a connected component G1 =
(V1, E1) of G
′ with |V1| ≥ 2 (then, |E1| ≥ 2 since M and M
S are maxi-
mum matchings). The following property holds:
22
Property 1. If G1 is a cycle then 2|Q
∗ ∩ V1| ≥ |V1|. If it is a path then
2|Q∗ ∩ V1| ≥ |V1| − 1
Proof. We study two cases: G1 is an even cycle or an even path. Note that
in both cases, if the inequality is false then there is in Gi an edge in M
∗
with no extremity in Q∗.
Assume G1 is an even cycle (x1, x2, · · · , x2p, x1), where edges (x2i−1, x2i)
are in M∗. Wlog. let say that (x3, x4) is an edge such that x3, x4 6∈ Q
∗.
Suppose that x2 is in Q
∗. Then let the state S′ be the same state as S up
to the facts that x3 plays x4, x4 plays x3, and all the (unmatched) neighbors
of x5 do not play x5 (but another (matched) vertex). This is possible since x5
is not adjacent to a leaf, because unmatched vertices (inMS) are not in Q∗
and the unmatched vertices form an independent set (MS is a maximum
matching). S′ is an equilibrium compatible with 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 with MS
′
not
maximum, contradiction.
So neither x2 nor x5 are in Q
∗. If x2 or x5 has an unmatched neighbor
u, say x5, then there is an equilibrium S
′ compatible with 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 with
|MS
′
∩M∗| > |MS ∩M∗|: S′ is the same as S up to the facts that x5 and u
are matched (play each other), x3 and x4 are matched, and no vertex plays
x2.
Finally, if neither x2 nor x5 have an unmatched neighbor, then consider
the state S′ which is the same as S up to the facts that x3 plays x4 and x4
plays x3. S
′ is compatible with 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 but MS
′
is not maximum, contra-
diction.
Now, suppose that G1 = (V1, E1) is an even path (x1, · · · , x2p+1). Let
(x2i−1, x2i) be an edge in M
∗ with no extremity in Q∗. The previous argu-
ments work unless the edge under consideration is (x1, x2). But then the
state S′ which is the same as S up to the facts that x1 plays x2, x2 plays x1
and no vertex plays x3 is a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with 〈T
∗, Q∗〉
such that |MS
′
∩M∗| > |MS ∩M∗|, contradiction. 
Now, let x1 be a vertex unmatched by M
S and matched by M∗ (x1 is
a leaf of G1 where G1 is a path of length at least 2 of G
′ = (V,MS∆M∗)).
We are interested in edges ei = (ui, vi) ∈ M
S ∩M∗ with i ≤ q such that
(x1, vi) ∈ E.
Property 2 . Among the edges of {e1, . . . , eq} whose extremities are not
leaves, there is at most one edge, say e1 = (u1, v1), such that u1, v1 /∈ Q
∗.
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is another edge
e2 = (u2, v2) ∈ M
S ∩M∗ such that (x1, v2) ∈ E, u2, v2 /∈ Q
∗ and u2, v2 are
not leaves. See Figure 10. We show that 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 is not feasible.
We study several cases depending on the neighborhood of u1. Remark
that neither u1 nor u2 is adjacent to a vertex unmatched inM
S and different
from x1, otherwise an augmenting path exists. In every case, we will assume
that if a vertex w unmatched inMS is adjacent to v1, then Sw 6= v1 because
w is not a leaf of G. As previously indicated it is always possible.
• (u1, x1) ∈ E. In this case we have a diminishing configuration (g)
(recall that x1 /∈ Q
∗ by Lemma 3) w.r.t. 〈T ∗, Q∗〉 and MS .
• (u1, v2) ∈ E. We get a diminishing configuration (a) on the path
(v1, u1, v2, u2).
• (u1, u2) ∈ E. v1 and v2 cannot be adjacent to an unmatched vertex
different from x1, otherwise an augmenting path exists. Then there is
a diminishing configuration (a) on the path (v1, u1, u2, v2).
• Finally, since u1 is not a leaf, it is adjacent to a vertex w 6= u2, v2, x1
which is necessarily matched with z in MS . We get a diminishing
configuration (h) on the path (z, w, u1, v1, x1, v2, u2). 
Assume that there are t connected components G1, . . . , Gt in the graph
G′ = (V,MS∆M∗), and that in Gi, pi vertices are in Q
∗. Let F be the
edges ei = (ui, vi) ∈ M
∗ ∩MS such that ui, vi /∈ Q
∗, ui is not a leaf and vi
is adjacent to a vertex unmatched byMS and matched by M∗ (as indicated
in Property 2), let R be the set of edges in M∗ ∩ MS with at least one
extremity in Q∗, and let q = |F | and r = |R|.
We are ready to build the solution 〈T ′, Q′〉 compatible with M∗ as fol-
lows. For each edge (x, y) ∈M∗: if it is in some Gi or if it is in R, then we
force both x and y (toward each other). Otherwise, if it is in F then one
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of its extremities, say y, is adjacent to a vertex matched by M∗ but not by
MS : we force y (toward x). The other vertices are unforced (in particular
some edge (u, v) 6∈ F with u and v not in Q∗ may exist; we do not force any
of its extremity). Note that Q∗ ⊆ Q′.
By definition, we get that:
|Q∗| ≥
t∑
i=1
pi + r (1)
By construction of 〈T ′, Q′〉 and Property 1 we get that:
|Q′| ≤ 2
t∑
i=1
pi + 2r + q ≤ 2|Q
∗|+ q (2)
Finally, using Property 1, we get that ∀i ≤ t, pi ≥ 1. Thus, by Property
2 we obtain:
q ≤ t ≤
t∑
i=1
pi ≤ |Q
∗| (3)
Using inequalities (1), (2) and (3), we obtain |Q′| ≤ 3|Q∗|.
By construction M∗ is compatible with 〈T ′, Q′〉. Let us finally prove
that 〈T ′, Q′〉 is a feasible solution. For the sake of contradiction, suppose
that there is a Stackelberg equilibrium S2 compatible with 〈T ′, Q′〉 and such
that |MS
2
| < |M∗|.
Let G′ = (V,MS
2
∆M∗). G′ is made of even cycles, even paths and odd
paths where the two final edges are in M∗. Moreover, such an odd path
must exist in G′. Denote it by P = (v1, . . . , v2l). Note that every vertex of
Gi matched in M
∗ is forced in 〈T ′, Q′〉, so each edge of P which is in M∗ is
also in MS .
Suppose that there is a vertex w unmatched in MS with N (w) =
{v1, v2l}. Then w plays v1 or v2l in S
2, and since S2 is an equilibrium,
v1 (or v2l) is in Q
′. In particular, v2 (or v2l−1) is matched in S
2, meaning
that P contains at least 2 edges. Note that vertices v2, · · · , v2l−1 are not
in Q′ hence not in Q∗. If v1 (or v2l) is in Q
∗, then we get a diminishing
configuration (a) w.r.t. 〈T ∗, Q∗〉, contradiction. But otherwise v1 (or v2l) is
in Q′ \Q∗ and v2 6∈ Q
′, meaning that v1 is adjacent to a vertex x1 matched
in M∗ but not in MS , and there would be an augmenting path in MS .
So we suppose now that there is no vertex w unmatched in MS with
N (w) = {v1, v2l}. Then if P has at least 2 edges, there exists a diminishing
configuration (a) w.r.t. 〈T ∗, Q∗〉. But if P is (v1, v2), v1 and v2 are not in
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Q′, they are not leaves (otherwise one of them would be matched in MS
2
).
Let t and x be the vertices played by v1 and v2 in S
2 (possibly x = t). If
t and x are matched in MS then there is a diminishing configuration (b),
(c) or (d) w.r.t. 〈T ∗, Q∗〉. If t and x are unmatched in MS , then x = t
(or there is an augmenting path), x is adjacent to a third vertex y which is
necessarily matched inMS , and we get a diminishing configuration (g) w.r.t.
〈T ∗, Q∗〉. Finally, x is unmatched and t is matched inMS . x is adjacent to a
vertex y 6= v1, v2 which is necessarily matched inM
S . We get a diminishing
configuration (h) on vertices (St, t, v1, v2, x, y, Sy), contradiction.
In conclusion, 〈T ′, Q′〉 is a feasible solution and the proof is complete. 
6 Conclusion
The 6-approximation algorithm for mfv in general graphs is achieved in
two steps, namely a 2-approximation and a 3-approximation. One can show
that the analysis of both steps is (asymptotically) tight; an interesting future
work would be to reach a better approximation algorithm by considering a
global approach. Due to the importance of the assignment problem, it is
also worth studying the complexity and approximability of mfv in bipartite
graphs.
The model studied for the mvf problem can be extended in many di-
rections. For example, require a feasible not to reach a social optimum in
any case but to reach an approximation of it. In this paper we considered
a fixed unit cost for every forced node but it is natural to study a version
where the nodes have different cost for being forced.
Finally, our study focuses on Nash equilibria, i.e. states resilient to devi-
ations by any single player. An interesting extension is to deal with simulta-
neous deviations by several players. In particular, simultaneous deviations
of two players is considered in the stable marriage problem mentioned in
introduction, where a solution is stable if there is no pair (x, y) of players
where both x and y would be happier to be together than with their re-
spective husband/wife in the solution. In our setting, a state is called a
2-strong equilibrium if it is resilient to deviations of at most 2 players. More
generally, a state is a k-strong equilibrium if it is resilient to deviations of at
most k-players, and it is a strong equilibrium if this is true for coalitions of
arbitrary size. Then the k-strong (resp. strong) price of anarchy is defined
as the price of anarchy but for k-strong (resp. strong) equilibria.
Dealing with this last issue, we show that the notions of 2-strong, k-
strong and strong equilibria coincide for the game we consider, and that
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states resilient to deviations of several players are much better in term of
social welfare than simple Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1. A 2-strong equilibrium is a strong equilibrium.
Proof. Let S be a 2-strong equilibrium and suppose that S is not a strong
equilibrium. There exists a coalition of players C, with |C| > 2, whose
members can deviate from S and benefit. For every member of C, the
utility is equal to 0 before the deviation, and then equal to 1. This means
that S contains some pairs of unmatched neighbors, and it contradicts the
fact that S is a 2-strong equilibrium. 
Theorem 7. The strong price of anarchy is 1/2.
Proof. Let S be a 2-strong equilibrium whereas S∗ is an optimum state. For
every edge (i, j) ∈ E, we have max{ui(S), uj(S)} ≥ 1. Take a maximum car-
dinality matchingM∗ and use the previous inequality to get that SW(S) =∑
i∈V ui(S) ≥
∑
{i,j}∈M∗ ui(S) + uj(S) ≥
∑
{i,j}∈M∗ max{ui(S), uj(S)}. It
follows that SW(S) ≥ |M∗| = SW(S∗)/2. Take a path of length 3 as a tight
example. 
However, considering the mfv problem for strong equilibria is an inter-
esting topic that is worth being considered in some future works.
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